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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b): Standards for
Relief from Judgments Due to Changes in Law
In order to protect the finality of judgments, federal courts
have often asserted that relief from a final judgment may not be
granted due to a subsequent change in the judge-made law on
which a court relied in reaching the judgment.' Such assertions are
belied by the facts: relief due to a subsequent change in law was
available in the federal courts under the writ system that existed
prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2
See, e.g., Lubben v. Selective Serv., 453 F.2d 645, 650 (1st Cir. 1972); Title v. United
States, 263 F.2d 28, 31 (9th Cir. 1959); Collins v. City of Wichita, 254 F.2d 837, 839 (10th
Cir. 1958); Berryhill v. United States, 199 F.2d 217, 219 (6th Cir. 1952); Loucke v. United
States, 21 F.R.D. 305, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). Professor Moore has also made this assertion. See
7 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 60.26[3], at 325 (2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as MOORE].
This comment deals only with a change in judge-made law. It is settled that a change in
statutory law will not serve as the basis of relief from a final judgment. See Ross v. Oregon,
227 U.S. 150, 160-63 (1913).
If the judgment has not become final, there is no question that relief may be obtained
due to a change of judge-made law. In United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
103 (1801.), the Supreme Court laid the foundation for this principle by granting relief in a
judgment still sub judice. In Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538 (1941),
the Court extended this rule to diversity actions in stating that "[u]ntil such time as a case
is no longer sub judice, the duty rests upon Federal courts to apply state law under the Rules
of Decision Statute in accordance with the then controlling decision of the highest state
court." 311 U.S. at 543. See also Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232 (1944).
2 Prior to the amendment of the Federal Rules in 1948 to include subsections 60(b)(4)-
(6), relief from judgments was available under the writ system. In the event of a change of
law, relief was sought under the writs of audita querela, coram nobis, or coram vobis and, for
judgments in equity, through a bill of review. Broadly stated, the writ of audita querela
applied to matters arising after the judgment, such as the discovery of new facts, discharge
of the judgment, or a change of law. Coram nobis and coram vobis applied to clerical errors
or the error or omission of facts in the original judgment. The bill of review incorporated both
of these writs for judgments in equity. See 7 MOORE, supra note 1, 60.12-.15, at 33-72;
Moore & Rogers, Federal Relief from Civil Judgments, 55 YALE L.J. 623, 659-82 (1946)
[hereinafter cited as YALE ARTICLE].
The lack of clarity of the scope of relief available under the writs must be emphasized.
See Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 614 (1949). For example, although the primary
scope of the writ of audita querela was to provide relief based on matters occurring subsequent
to the judgment, this rule was frequently ignored. YALE ARTICLE, supra, at 660. But see
Luparelli v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 117 N.J.L. 342, 188 A. 451 (1936). In abolishing the
writs, the Federal Rules incorporated the relief provided by them. Justice Black noted in
Klapprott v. United States that
[lt is contended that the "other reasons" clause of Rule 60(b)(6) should be interpreted
so as to deny relief except under circumstances sufficient to have authorized relief under
the common law writs of coram nobis and audita querela, and that the facts shown here
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and cases decided under rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules currently
provide such relief.3 There are conflicting views on the standard that
should govern the granting of relief due to a change in law. The
primary source of the confusion has been the decision to grant or
deny relief on the basis of the broad "extraordinary circumstances"
standard of rule 60(b)(6). The courts have generally proceeded
under clause (6) and, without adequate guidance, have been forced
to resolve petitions for relief based on their own notions of justice.
This unguided discretion raises the possibility that inconsistent re-
sults will be reached by different courts in applying the same legal
standard to substantially similar facts. In light of this situation, this
comment argues that relief should be available under clause (5)
rather than clause (6) of rule 60(b). An application of the literal
language of clause (5) would provide more concrete guidelines for
would not have justified relief under these common law proceedings. One thing wrong
with this contention is that few courts ever have agreed as to what circumstances would
justify relief under these old remedies. To accept this contention would therefore intro-
duce needless confusion in the administration of rule 60(b) and would also circumscribe
it within needless and uncertain boundaries. Furthermore rule 60(b) strongly indicates
on its face that courts no longer are to be hemmed in by the uncertain boundaries of
these and other common law remedial tools.
335 U.S. at 614; see Bankers Mort. Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1970). But see
Lapin v. Shulton, Inc., 333 F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1964). Although examination of the writs is
useful in ascertaining the nature and scope of relief available in past cases, the writs do not
determine the scope of relief presently obtainable.
3 See, e.g., Pierce v. Cook & Co., 518 F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct.
866 (1976); Tsakonites v. Transpacific Carriers Corp., 322 F. Supp. 722 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
Rule 60 currently provides that:
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence, Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence;
Fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party
or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered
evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or ex-
trinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment
is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment
upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable
that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying
relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable
time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order,
or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect
the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power
of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order,
or proceeding, or to grant relief to a defendant not actually personally notified as pro-
vided in Title 28, U.S.C. § 1655, or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court.
Writs of coram nobis, coram vobis, audita querela, and bills of review and bills in the
nature of a bill of review, are abolished, and the procedure for obtaining any relief from
a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.
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relief while allowing the achievement of equitable results without
the high degree of uncertainty which clause (6) has generated.
Part I of the comment identifies the factors that should govern
in the choice of an appropriate standard for granting or denying
relief due to a change in law. In particular, the conflicting goals of
the finality of judgments and the equitable disposition of individual
cases are examined. Part II of the comment discusses and criticizes
the manner in which clause (5) and clause (6) have been applied by
the courts. Part I proposes the use of an expanded definition of the
standard embodied in clause (5) to govern relief due to a change in
law and explores the implications of this suggestion.
I. THE FACTORS INVOLVED IN FORMULATING A STANDARD
That litigation should finally come to an end is a well recog-
nized principle. On the other hand, a totally inflexible rule of final-
ity might cause injustice in particular cases. An acceptable stan-
dard for granting relief from a final judgment must be the product
of a careful compromise between these principles. This compromise
cannot be reached without a brief examination of the constituent
elements of the concerns relating to finality and equitable results.
The principle of finality is expressed primarily through the re-
lated doctrines of res judicata and stare decisis. Under the former
doctrine, a final judgment on the merits is an absolute bar to a
subsequent action between the same parties, or those in privity with'
the original parties, based on the same claim or cause of action. In
addition, as to matters which were necessarily litigated and deter-
mined pursuant to a final judgment in one claim, the judgment
constitutes an estoppel as to those matters in a later action even
though the second action is based on a different claim.4 Stare decisis
is composed of two competing elements. The first element requires
a court to abide by the rules of law it has developed or which have
been developed by other courts to which it owes obedience. The
doctrine also requires the self-correction of error under appropriate
circumstances. 5 Because of the competition set up by these two
elements of stare decisis, this doctrine commands a lesser degree of
finality than does the doctrine of res judicata6
The finality principle accomplishes several objectives impor-
tant to the judicial system. The achievement of a final resolution
6A MOORE, supra note 1, 60.02, at 4019.
Id. at 4022.
Id. at 4022-23.
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of disputes furthers the goal of social stability, for "the aid of judi-
cial tribunals would not be invoked for the vindication of rights...
if. . .conclusiveness did not attend the judgments of such tribun-
als."7 Another goal served by the principle of finality, through the
doctrine of stare decisis, is the goal of certainty in the legal stan-
dards to be applied in similar fact situations. This certainty furthers
efficient judicial administration by lessening the degree to which
the courts must rely on their own discretion and provides individu-
als with a basis on which to gauge their conduct.8 As expressed
through the doctrine of res judicata, the principle of finality serves
the important purpose of allowing litigants and third parties to rely
and act upon the basis of a final judgment, thus also serving the
goals of consistency and certainty
A determination as to when the principle of finality of judg-
ments should be relaxed should proceed on the assumption that
relief from judgment should be granted in a manner that conflicts
least with the goals served by finality. Broadly stated, justice re-
quires that individuals receive similar treatment from the courts.
The heart of this requirement is that similar controversies involving
similar claims under equivalent situations should reach the same
results. When the law changes, litigants may receive disparate
treatment; to equalize this treatment, relief from a judgment may
be necessary. Relief is equitable when its goal is the achievement of
consistent results.'0 Although relief from final judgment is at times
appropriate to achieve a consistent and equitable result, there must
be limitations on the availability of such relief.
The limitations on relief are based on equitable considerations.
If a third party has reasonably relied and acted upon a final judg-
ment, and if reopening the judgment would injure or prejudice the
third party, then it would seem unjust to reopen the judgment. The
same considerations are not necessarily applicable when the reli-
ance placed upon the final judgment is by one of the original parties
to the suit. By itself, such reliance would not seem sufficient to
prevent relief from judgments since the original parties may always
claim reliance in an effort to avoid a reopening which may work to
Southern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 49 (1897) (Harlan, J.).
Pierce v. Cook & Co., 518 F.2d 720, 723 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 866
(1976).
United States v. Ohio Power Co., 353 U.S. 98, 110 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See
generally 6A MOORE, supra note 1, T 60.02, at 4019-23.
I* Gondeck v. Pan American World Airways, 382 U.S. 25 (1965); United States v. Ohio
Power Co., 353 U.S. 98 (1957). Consistency is also an aspect of the finality of judgments.
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their personal detriment. When combined with other factors, how-
ever, reliance by one of the original parties may be sufficient to
prevent reopening of the judgment. One such factor is the length of
time that has passed since the judgment became final. The more
time that has passed since the judgment became final, the more
likely it is that the relying party will be prejudiced. This concept
applies to reliance by third parties as well. Therefore, unless the
party wishing to reopen the judgment moves to do so within a rea-
sonable time after the judgment, relief should not be granted. The
reasonableness of time should be interpreted in light of the poten-
tiality for harm to parties who have relied on the finality of the
judgment.
Relief should not be granted to a party who has failed to do
everything reasonably within his power to achieve a favorable result
before the judgment becomes final. If a party could have avoided
conflicts with the principle of finality by doing everything within his
power to achieve a favorable result before the judgment became
final, but decided not to use the opportunity or neglected to do so,
there are no compelling reasons to relieve him from the conse-
quences of his own choice or negligence. Without this requirement,
a rule granting relief from final judgment would likely degenerate
into a mere substitute for appeal and completely subvert the princi-
ple of finality.
Consistent with the goals of certainty, efficient judicial admin-
istration, consistency of results, and social stability, an additional
general limitation on a rule granting relief from final judgments may
be derived. The standard itself must be clear in wording and mean-
ing; in addition, there should be only one standard to cover a generic
set of fact situations such as a change in law. A multiplicity of
standards would lead inevitably to inconsistent results. To allow the
courts to rely on a more general rule when a more specific and
pertinent standard is available raises the danger of inconsistent
results and promotes an inefficient judicial procedure. Rule 60(b)
was adopted to provide a more definite standard for the granting of
relief from final judgments; the problem is that the application of
the rule has not resulted in narrowing the boundaries of relief suffi-
ciently to establish an acceptable compromise between the goals of
finality and equity.
II. THE CURRENT JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF RULE 60(b)
Before the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended in
1948, relief from judgment due to a change in law was available only
[43:646
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through the writ system." Under current law, relief is available only
under the provisions of rule 60(b). 1- Furthermore, since the provi-
sions of rule 60(b) are mutually exclusive, only one clause may
apply.'3 The mutual exclusivity principle makes vitally important
a procedural difference between the first three clauses and the last
three clauses of the rule. Clauses (1) through (3) limit relief to
within one year of the entry of judgment while clauses (4) through
(6) allow relief within a "reasonable time" after the judgment is
entered."
" See note 2 supra. As adopted in 1938, the Federal Rules contained a savings clause
which preserved relief under the writs. The original rule 60 provided relief from a judgment
only in the event of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; such relief was
available only within six months of the judgment. See 6A MOORE, supra note 1, 60.01, at
4007-16. In cases arising between 1938 and 1948, the courts held that both audita querela and
a bill of review could provide relief from a final judgment in the event of a subsequent change
of law. In International Ry. Co. v. Davidson, 65 F. Supp. 58 (W.D.N.Y. 1945), the court
granted a bill of review in order to modify an injunction on the basis of Supreme Court dicta.
In Oliver v. City of Shattuck, 157 F.2d 150 (10th Cir. 1946), plaintiff was a party to one of
two similar cases; plaintiff did not appeal an adverse judgment. Implying that audita querela
was applicable, the court granted relief from the final judgment when the tandem case was
reversed; the exact basis of relief was not made clear. But see Phelan v. Bradbury Bldg. Corp.
7 F.R.D. 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1947), in which the plaintiff was denied relief from a settlement even
though subsequent decisions entitled the plaintiff to greater relief.
12 According to rule 60(b), a court may still entertain an independent action in equity to
relieve a party from a final judgment; such actions are, however, rare. 11 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 239 (1973) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT &
MILLER].
'1 Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 614-15 (1949). See also United States v.
Karahalias, 205 F.2d 331 (2d Cir. 1953). Although this clear rule of mutual exclusivity is
important in determining whether relief is limited by the one year provision of rules 60(b)(1)-
(3), the courts have not emphasized this distinction. In fact, courts at times simply grant
relief on the basis of rule 60(b) without specifying the specific clause on which they rely. See,
e.g., Tarkington v. United States Lines Co., 222 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1955).
" The definition of "reasonable time" is uncertain. The cases, which grant relief after
several years have elapsed but deny relief after several months, do not present a consistent
definition. See, e.g., Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601 (1949) (four years reasonable);
FDIC v. Alker, 234 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1956) (ten years reasonable); Tsakonites v. Transpacific
Carriers Corp., 322 F. Supp. 722 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (immediately after a change in the law-but
five years after rendition of the final judgment-was reasonable); Pierre v. Bernuth, Lembcke
Co., 20 F.R.D. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (three years, while plaintiff was in a mental institution,
reasonable); In re Cremidas' Estate, 14 F.R.D. 15 (D. Alas. 1953) (three years reasonable).
But see Delzona Corp. v. Sacks, 265 F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 1959) (one and a half years unreasona-
ble); Morgan v. Southern Farm Bur. Cas. Ins. Corp., 42 F.R.D. 25 (W.D. La. 1967) (twenty-
three months per se unreasonable).
The only unifying principles that can be drawn from the cases are that the motion for
relief must be made as soon as the disability-either physical or through a change of law-has
been removed, and that the prejudice to intervening rights will, in effect, make the length of
time unreasonable. In re Cremidas' Estate, 14 F.R.D. 15 (D. Alas. 1953). For removal of
physical disability, see Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601 (1949); Pierre v. Bernuth,
Lembcke Co., 20 F.R.D. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). For change of law, see Tsakonites v.
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Although there is some disagreement over the scope of rule
60(b)(1),15 it is generally accepted that a rule granting relief from
final judgment may not be found in the first three clauses of rule
60(b). 6 It is also settled that rule 60(b)(4), granting relief if the
judgment is void, does not provide an avenue for relief due to a
change in law. The courts have clearly rejected the contention that
a change of law renders a judgment void. 7 Therefore, if relief from
final judgment is to be available due to a change in law, it must be
available under either rule 60(b)(5) or rule 60(b)(6).
A. Rule 60(b)(5): The Current Boundaries
Rule 60(b)(5) provides for relief from final judgment if
the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a
prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judg-
ment should have prospective application; . . .
The usage of rule 60(b)(5) has been based primarily on the third
subsection of the rule dealing with the inequity of prospective appli-
Transpacific Carriers Corp., 322 F. Supp. 722 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). But see Delzona Corp. v.
Sacks, 265 F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 1959); Morgan v. Southern Farm Bur. Cas. Ins. Co., 42 F.R.D.
25 (W.D. La. 1967).
For d discussion of the time element in seeking relief under rule 60(b), see Comment,
Temporal Aspects of the Finality of Judgments: The Significance of Federal Rule 60(b), 17
U. Cm. L. REv. 664 (1950) [hereinafter cited as CHICAGO COMMENT].
"5 From dictum in Schildhaus v. Moe, 335 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1964), noting that "there is
indeed good sense in permitting the trial court to correct its own errors," id. at 531, it could
be inferred that a trial court could use rule 60(b)(1) to correct its own errors if the law
changes. In Schildhaus, however, such relief was denied. In Tarkington v. United States Lines
Co., 222 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1955), the Second Circuit granted relief, apparently to correct its
error when the law changed eleven days after the final judgment, under rule 60(b). One
commentator has implied that this relief ought to be viewed as predicated on rule 60(b)(1).
11 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 12, at 176. However, in Silk v. Sandoval, 435 F.2d 1266 (1st
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1012 (1971), Judge Aldrich contended that relief for judicial
error of law is available only under rule 59. See also Note, Federal Rule 60(b): Finality of
Civil Judgments v. Self-Correction by District Court of Judicial Error of Law, 43 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 98 (1967). Professor Moore advocates judicial correction of errors of law under
rule 60(b)(1), but notes that it is not presently available. 7 MOORE, supra note 1, 60.22[3],
at 260-61. But cf. District of C. Fed. Civ. Ass'n v. Volpe, 520 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See
also Note, Pierce v. Cook & Co.: Change in State Law as a Ground for Relief from a Federal
Judgment, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 843, 848-50 (1976).
IS Rules 60(b)(2) and (3) are inapplicable on their face.
" Title v. United States, 263 F.2d 28 (9th Cir. 1959); United States v. Failla, 164 F. Supp.
307 (D.N.J. 1958); see Lubben v. Selective Serv., 453 F.2d 645, 649 (1st Cir. 1972) ("In the
interest of finality, the concept of void judgments is narrowly construed. . . . Only in the
rare instance of a clear usurpation of power will a judgment be rendered void.") See also
Phelan v. Bradbury Bldg. Corp., 7 F.R.D. 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
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cation.5 In System Federation v. Wright, the Supreme Court held
that relief from a continuing injunction was available in the event
of a change of law. 9 The courts have, however, refused to apply the
third subsection of clause (5) when the judgment was at law.20 Relief
from a money judgment has not been available on the ground of
prospective inequitability of the judgment.2'
The courts have given a very narrow construction to the second
subsection of rule 60(b) (5), which allows relief from judgment on the
grounds that "a prior judgment upon which [the final judgment]
is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated." Relief has been
limited in practice to judgments directly related, by parties and
claims, to the prior decision. 2  For example, relief from an order
enforcing a judgment is available if the case establishing liability is
subsequently reversed.? A leading commentator has suggested that
the second subsection of rule 60(b)(5) cannot be applied to give
relief where a precedent relied on by the court is reversed after final
judgment, regardless of the extent to which the court relied upon the
precedent in reaching its decision.2 1
There is no evidence in the legislative history of rule 60(b)(5)
that commands this narrow view of the second subsection.2 1 Fur-
" For a useful discussion of the third subsection of rule 60(b)(5), and a collection of the
major cases interpreting that subsection, see Annot., 14 A.L.R. Fed. 309 (1973).
" 364 U.S. 642, 647 (1960); cf. Harrell v. Harder, 369 F. Supp. 810 (D. Conn. 1974). But
cf. McGrath v. Potash, 199 F.2d 166 (D.C. Cir. 1952). See also Block v. Thousandfriend, 170
F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1948).
' Theriault v. Smith, 519 F.2d 809 (1st Cir. 1975); Class v. Norton, 507 F.2d 1058 (2d
Cir. 1974); Elgin Nat'l Watch Co. v. Barrett, 213 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1954); McGrath v. Potash,
199 F.2d 166 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Harrell v. Harder, 369 F. Supp. 810 (D. Conn. 1974). But cf.
Lubben v. Selective Serv., 453 F.2d 645 (1st Cir. 1972); Sunbeam Corp. v. Charles Appli-
ances, 119 F. Supp. 492 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
21 Ryan v. United States Lines Co., 303 F.2d 430, 434 (2d Cir. 1962); accord, Daylo v.
Administrator of Vet. Aff., 501 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (by implication).
2 See 7 MOORE, supra note 1, T 60.26[3], at 325; 11 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 12,
at 204.
23 Michigan Sur. Co. v. Service Mach. Corp., 277 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960), provides a
good example of the narrow construction given the second subsection of rule 60(b)(5). A suit
for damages in federal court was based on a state court injunction against attachment involv-
ing the same parties and the same claim. After the damages claim in federal court had
become final, the injunction was voided in the state court. Relief from the final judgment
was given in federal court on the basis of the second subsection of rule 60(b)(5). Id. at 533.
21 7 MOORE, supra note 1, 60.26[3], at 325, citing Title v. United States, 263 F.2d 28
(9th Cir. 1959); Collins v. City of Wichita, 254 F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1958); Loucke v. United
States, 21 F.R.D. 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). See also 11 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 12, at 205.
' Rule 60(b)(5) was proposed in 1946 in ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCE-
DURE, REPORT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES (1946) [hereinafter cited as REPORT]. The Report never explic-
itly mentions rule 60(b)(5); the Report noted that "the federal rules will deal with the practice
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thermore, in Lubben v. Selective Service, the First Circuit sug-
gested a broader interpretation of the "based on" language of rule
60(b) (5) in stating that "the prior judgment must be a necessary
element of the decision, giving rise, for example, to the cause of
action or a successful defense.""6 Under the broader interpretation
suggested by this language, the extent of a court's reliance on a
particular precedent in reaching a final judgment would become the
crucial factor in determining whether to grant relief from a final
judgment when the precedent was subsequently reversed. Mere ci-
tation or partial reliance on a particular precedent that was subse-
quently reversed would be insufficient for the granting of relief
under rule 60(b)(5).27 Only if the court could not have reached its
decision but for its reliance on a binding and subsequently reversed
precedent would relief under the "based on" standard be granted.
Although the court in Lubben perhaps did not intend to broaden the
in every sort of case in which relief from final judgments is asked, and prescribe the practice."
Id. at 82. The purpose of this change was to abolish the conflicting relief under the writs and
the Federal Rules. See YALE ARTICLE, supra note 2, at 623. The Report also stated that "Rule
60(b) does not assume to define the substantive law as to the grounds for vacating judgments,
but merely prescribes the practice in proceedings to obtain relief." REPORT, supra, at 84.
Beyond this statement, the history of the amendment adding rule 60(b)(5) indicates only that
the writs were to be incorporated into the Federal Rules; however, relief has not been limited
to the scope of the writs. See Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 614 (1949); Bankers
Mort. Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 73, 77 (5th Cir. 1970).
2' 453 F.2d 645, 650 (1st Cir. 1972).
Language in Berryhill v. United States, 199 F.2d 217 (6th Cir. 1952), supports this
limitation on a broadened interpretation of rule 60(b)(5). In Berryhill the plaintiff sought
relief from a judgment denying National Service Life Insurance benefits; since the Supreme
Court had ruled in Woodward v. United States, 341 U.S. 112 (1951), that a like-situated party
was entitled to the benefits, relief was sought on the basis of, inter alia, rule 60(b)(5). In
denying relief under rule 60(b)(5), the court noted:
We are of the opinion that the judgment in this case was not "based" upon a prior
judgment which has been reversed or otherwise vacated within the meaning of subsec-
tion 5 of Rule 60(b). The ruling of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in
Woodward v. United States, supra, was not controlling upon the District Judge, sitting
in a different circuit, and the record does not show that the District Judge "based" his
ruling upon the decision in that case. With the conflicting rulings of the Third and
Eighth Circuits before him, each persuasive only, the District Judge ruled in accordance
with his own view of the applicable law. Certainly it was not the purpose of the rule to
permit a final judgment to be set aside whenever thereafter any case from another
jurisdiction involving the same question and decided the same way is later reversed by
an Appellate Court.
199 F.2d at 219 (emphasis added).
In Lubben v. Selective Serv., 453 F.2d 645 (1st Cir. 1972), the court noted in dictum that
"[iut is not sufficient that the prior judgment provides only precedent for the decision." Id.
at 650. In Lubben the court "relied heavily" on another district court case which was subse-
quently reversed, but that was insufficient grounds for relief from the judgment. Id.; cf.
Polites v. United States, 364 U.S. 426, 433 (1960).
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interpretation of the "based on" language of rule 60(b)(5),8 such a
broadened interpretation is not an unnatural reading of the lan-
guage of the subsection.
The rationale supporting the narrow interpretation of the
"based on" language of rule 60(b) (5) has not been made clear by the
commentators 9 or in the cases. 0 Although the reasons for the nar-
row interpretation have not been articulated, several can be postu-
lated. The primary reason for the narrow view is likely to be found
in the desire to protect the finality of judgments.3 1 However, mere
citation to the principle of finality is not a sufficient reason to refuse
to grant relief due to a change in law under all circumstances. In
some situations finality must and does give way to the equitable
considerations that underlie a claim for relief due to a change in
law.32
Beyond this desire to protect the finality of judgments, another
possible explanation for the narrow interpretation of rule 60(b)(5)
is the attempt to prevent a flood of litigation when judge-made law
changes. Such a flood of litigation would not, however, be likely to
result from a use of the interpretation of rule 60(b)(5) suggested by
the Lubben court. Under this standard, the court must have relied
so heavily on the reversed precedent that it could not have reached
its decision without relying on that precedent and the precedent
relied upon must be of a binding and not merely persuasive effect.
In addition to the express limitations of the Lubben standard, there
are three general equitable principles that serve to limit the
granting of relief due to a change in law. First, a party must have
done all within his power to obtain the proper result before the
" The Lubben court cited and relied on Professor Moore's narrow interpretation of the
"based on" language in reaching its decision that relief could not be granted because the final
judgment was not based on the subsequently reversed precedent. And the court, again in
dictum, also stated that "a change in applicable law does not provide sufficient basis for relief
under Rule 60(b)(5)." Lubben v. Selective Serv., 453 F.2d 645, 650 (1st Cir. 1972).
29 See 7 MOORE, supra note 1, 60.2613], at 325; 11 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 12,
at 203. The broad scope of the language of rule 60(b)(5) was noted in CHICAGO COMMENT, supra
note 14, but no definition was framed. See also 44 IowA L. REV. 574 (1959) (adopting the
narrow definition of rule 60(b)(5) without explanation); Note, Pierce v. Cook & Co.: Change
in State Law as a Ground for Relief from a Federal Judgment, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 843, 848-50
(1976) (adopting Professor Moore's definition of "based on").
30 See, e.g., Lubben v. Selective Serv., 453 F.2d 645, 650 (1st Cir. 1972); Berryhill v.
United States, 199 F.2d 217, 219 (6th Cir. 1952).
3' See, e.g., Berryhill v. United States, 199 F.2d 217 (6th Cir. 1952).
32 See, e.g., Pierce v. Cook & Co., 518 F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct.
866 (1976); Tsakonites v. Transpacific Carriers Corp., 322 F. Supp. 722 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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judgment became final.13 Second, the relief must be sought within
a reasonable time.34 Third, the courts have required that iritervening
rights not be prejudiced by the granting of relief.35 When combined
with the Lubben standard, these equitable limitations will prevent
a flood of litigation when the law changes.
B. Rule 60(b)(6): The Attempt at Judicial Definition
Relief from final judgment due to a change in law has been
considered primarily under rule 60(b)(6): "any other reason justify-
ing relief." Although the Supreme Court has never addressed the
issue of a change of law in relation to rule 60(b)(6), the Court has
on three occasions interpreted the rule in a more general context.
The lower courts have faced the specific question of relief due to a
change in law under the standard as provided in rule 60(b)(6) and
interkreted by the Supreme Court. These two sets of precedents will
be discussed in turn.
In Klapprott v. United States,36 the petitioner had been de-
prived of his naturalization in a default judgment procured while
the petitioner was ill and wrongfully incarcerated. More than four
years later the petitioner sought, and was granted, relief under rule
60(b)(6). For the majority, Justice Black emphasized the excep-
tional circumstances of the case and the fact that the petitioner had
not had a fair trial.37
See Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193 (1950). In Schildhaus v. Moe, 335 F.2d
529 (2d Cir. 1964), the failure to appeal the prior judgment was fatal to relief in circumstances
which might have otherwise justified the use of rule 60(b)(5); the courts in Lubben v.
Selective Serv., 453 F.2d 645 (1st Cir. 1972), and Berryhill v. United States, 199 F.2d 217 (6th
Cir. 1952), also indicated that a failure to appeal was an important consideration.
3 See cases cited note 14 supra.
In re Cremidas' Estate, 14 F.R.D. 15 (D. Alas. 1953); see Jackson v. Jackson, 276 F.2d
501 (D.C. Cir. 1960). See also 7 MOORE, supra note 1, 60.26[2]-.26[4], at 316-17, 334-35.
Retroactive application of judicial decision was the common practice until 1932. See
Ross v. Oregon, 227 U.S. 150 (1913). In that year, in Great N. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref.
Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932), the Supreme Court approved the practice of prospective overruling.
The prospective-only overruling of judicial decisions has since become a common practice,
especially in the field of criminal law. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) (giving
prospective-only effect to Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)). See generally Currier, Time
and Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling, 51 VA. L. REv. 201 (1965); Note,
Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907
(1962).
" 335 U.S. 601 (1949).
'7 335 U.S. at 614-15. It should also be noted that Klapprott was seeking to overturn a
default judgment; the Court emphasized the fact that he had never enjoyed a trial on the
merits. Id. at 615. The courts are perhaps more willing to rely on rule 60(b)(6) when the
judgment sought to be overturned was entered by default. See 7 MOORE, supra note 1,
60.27[21, at 358.
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One year later the Court again confronted rule 60(b)(6) in
Achermann v. United States2 In Ackermann, the petitioner's citi-
zenship had been revoked in a case that was tried with the case of
another German-born citizen (Keilbar); the same result of denatur-
alization was reached in the two cases. Keilbar appealed, but the
petitioner, on the advice of an officer of the Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service, did not." When Keilbar's case was reversed, the
petitioner sought relief under rule 60(b)(6). In denying relief, Justice
Minton stated:
Petitioner made a considered choice not to appeal, apparently
because he did not feel that an appeal would prove to be worth
what he thought was a required sacrifice of his home. This
chance was a risk, but calculated and deliberate and such as
follows a free choice. Petitioner cannot be relieved of such a
choice because hindsight seems to indicate to him that his
decision not to appeal was probably wrong, considering the
outcome of the Keilbar case. There must be an end to litigation
someday, and free, calculated, deliberate choices are not to be
relieved from.4
Klapprott was distinguished on the basis of its "extraordinary cir-
cumstances." These extraordinary circumstances included Klap-
prott's physical inability to appeal.4' For the dissenters, Justice
Black argued that petitioner had a right to rely on the advice of the
Service; therefore, "fairness" required the application of rule
60(b) (6) in this situation.42
In Polites v. United States,43 the petitioner's citizenship had
been revoked. He sought relief four years later under rules 60(b)(5)
and (6) on the ground that subsequent Supreme Court decisions had
changed the law on which petitioner's original case had been de-
cided. Since the petitioner had not appealed the original decision,
the Government argued that Ackermann controlled. The crux of the
majority's opinion was that even though some cases decided by the
Court after petitioner's original judgment reached different conclu-
sions, these cases did not change the law on which petitioner's judg-
340 U.S. 193 (1950).
3' In order to finance the appeal, petitioner would have had to sell his home; petitioner
was advised against this sale. 340 U.S. at 195-96.
" 340 U.S. at 198.
" Id. at 199.
12 Id. at 202-05.
' 364 U.S. 426 (1960).
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ment was based.4 Thus the Court reserved the issue whether change
of law is grounds for relief under 60(b).45 For the dissent, Justice
Brennan distinguished this case from Ackermann on the basis of the
apparent futility of appeal; because of the futility of appeal, the
dissent argued that the case must be treated as one in which the
petitioner did in fact appeal unsuccessfully. The dissent also
argued that the denaturalization order was based in equity and,
therefore, the Court should be able to use rule 60(b)(5) to adjust its
ruling in the event of a change of law.47
Three important points emerge from a reading of the Supreme
Court's interpretation of rule 60(b)(6). First, as the result in
Klapprott and the language in Ackermann indicate, 48 the applicable
standard for granting relief under clause (6) is an "extraordinary
circumstances" standard. Second, the language in Klapprott sug-
gests that, in applying this standard, a court must operate in an ad
hoc manner, balancing the need to protect finality against the
court's perceived need to do justice in the individual case.49 Third,
Ackermann establishes that when a litigant has made a considered
choice not to appeal before the judgment became final, relief from
that judgment should not be given even if there are extraordinary
circumstances. Whether or not relief should be granted if the liti-
gant failed to appeal because of the apparent futility of such action
is a question left open by the cases. The majority in Polites expressly
left this question open, while the dissent argued vigorously that
failure to appeal because of futility should not bar relief under
clause (6) of rule 60(b) .1 Perhaps the broadest rule that can be
drawn from these cases with any certainty is that in exceptional
circumstances rule 60(b) (6) gives the courts the power to grant relief
from a final judgment as long as the party has not freely and deliber-
ately failed to appeal." In Polites the Court reserved the issue of
" In holding that the reversal of the prior judgments did not affect the petitioner's case,
the Court was applying criteria similar to the "based on" criteria suggested by this comment
for use under rule 60(b)(5). The majority did not reach the change of law issue because the
result in petitioner's case would have been the same, the change in law notwithstanding.
4 364 U.S. at 433.
,s 364 U.S. at 438.
'7 Id. at 438-40.
340 U.S. at 199.
335 U.S. at 614-15.
"' See text at note 44 supra.
In other cases the courts have established additional rules of a more particular nature
for the application of rule 60(b)(6):
(a) The motion must be made within a "reasonable time." In re Cremidas' Estate, 14
F.R.D. 15 (D. Alas. 1952); see note 14 supra.
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whether a change of law constitutes such exceptional circumstan-
ces . 2 The lower courts have failed to resolve this issue in a system-
atic or consistent manner.
The issue as to whether a change in law can be the basis for
relief under rule 60(b)(6) has been faced on seven occasions by the
lower courts. Of these seven cases, only three-Collins v. City of
Wichita,5 3 Tsakonites v. Transpacific Carriers Corp.," and Pierce v.
Cook & Co. 55-shed any light on the issues left unanswered by the
Supreme Court and, unfortunately, these cases are in conflict. The
remaining cases, in which failure to appeal was fatal to relief,
merely echo the concepts first developed by the Supreme Court. 6
(b) "Clause (6) is a residual clause to be invoked only on the basis of some reason other
than those specified in the preceding clauses (1)-(5)." FDIC v. Alker, 30 F.R.D. 527, 532 (E.D.
Pa. 1962), afi'd, 316 F.2d 236 (3d Cir. 1963).
(c) A lower court cannot relieve the final judgment of a higher court; e.g., a district
court cannot grant a rule 60(b)(6) motion if the judgment has been appealed. See
International Ry. v. Davidson, 65 F. Supp. 58 (W.D.N.Y. 1945).
(d) Relief under rule 60(b)(6) is discretionary. Radack v. Norwegian Amer. Line
Agency, 318 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1963); Delzona Corp. v. Sacks, 265 F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 1959);
United States v. Karahalias, 205 F.2d 331 (2d Cir. 1953).
(e) Intervening rights cannot be prejudiced. In re Cremidas' Estate, 14 F.R.D. 15 (D.
Alas. 1953).
(f) Rule 60(b)(6) is not a substitute for appeal. Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S.
193 (1950).
2 See text at note 45 supra.
254 F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1958).
322 F. Supp. 722 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
518 F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 866 (1976).
Lubben v. Selective Serv., 453 F.2d 645 (1st Cir. 1972); Title v. United States, 263 F.2d
28 (9th Cir. 1959); Berryhill v. United States, 199 F.2d 217 (6th Cir. 1952); Loucke v. United
States, 21 F.R.D. 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
In three other cases relief was granted due to a change of law. However, these cases are
to be distinguished from the other cases applying rule 60(b)(6) which this comment discusses.
In Weilbacher v. United States, 99 F. Supp. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), the plaintiff's action
for libel in admiralty against a general agent of the United States had been dismissed on the
basis of McAllister v. Cosmopolitan Shipping Co., 337 U.S. 783 (1949). Subsequently, Con-
gress passed the Enabling Act, 46 U.S.C. § 745 (1970), retroactively authorizing suits against
government agents. The court allowed Weilbacher relief from the original judgment under
rule 60(b)(6). 99 F. Supp. at 111. This case is outside the scope of this comment since the
change of law was statutory, not judicial, as Congress had created a new cause of action.
Relief in this situation was a function of judicial deference to the legislature; this comment
is concerned solely with relief due to a judicial change in law.
In Tarkington v. United States Lines Co., 222 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1955), plaintiff's action
based on unseaworthiness ended in a directed verdict for the defendant. Eleven days after
the judgment became final the Supreme Court, in an unrelated case, reversed the case relied
upon by the trial court. Plaintiff, who had not appealed, moved for a new trial. Recognizing
that the motion for a new trial was properly denied as untimely, the Second Circuit held that
relief should be granted under rule 60(b), without specifying which clause applied. Id. at 359-
60. One commentator implies that relief in Tarkington was granted under rule 60(b)(1). See
7 MooRE, supra note 1, 60.22131, at 260-64; note 15 supra; cf. District of Columbia Fed.
The University of Chicago Law Review
Collins concerned the validity of the notice requirements in a
state condemnation statute. Plaintiff challenged the validity of the
statute and appealed an adverse decision. The court of appeals
affirmed, and certiorari was denied. More than a year later, in an-
other case involving different parties, the Supreme Court held that
the statute was invalid. 7 In denying relief under rule 60(b)(6), the
court noted:
[I]n the present case the appellants did appeal. . . . The
only difference in appellant's situation and that of Ackermann
is that their appeal was perfected and the judgment became
final after the appeal. In attempting to obtain relief from a
final judgment, there is no reason why an unsuccessful appel-
lant should be in a better position than one who did not appeal
Litigation must end some time. 8
In Tsakonites a seaman moved to vacate the prior dismissal of
his action which had been brought under the Jones Act and the
general maritime law. In the original suit, the lower courts ruled
that plaintiff's contacts with the United States (plaintiff was a
Greek national) were insufficient to justify application of the Jones
Act or the general maritime law; the Supreme Court denied certior-
ari. 9 In a similar case five years later the Supreme Court held that
the continuing contacts of the shipping company would justify ap-
plication of the Jones Act in favor of a similarly situated party. 0 The
Court noted the conflict in the circuits involving Tsakonites's origi-
Civ. Ass'n v. Volpe, 520 F.2d 451 (1975). One possible interpretation of Tarkington is that,
since the change in law occurred so soon after the judgment became final, the court, for
equitable reasons, felt compelled to grant relief under rule 60(b)(6), plaintiff's failure to
appeal notwithstanding. If so, Tarkington is clearly out of line with Ackermann.
In Amsden v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 147 (Ct. Cl. 1959), the plaintiff had partici-
pated in a prior suit which was settled. Another litigant (Tanner) contested the application
of the Economy Act which had controlled in all such cases; before Tanner's case was con-
cluded, plaintiff sought relief under rule 54(b) of the Rules of the Court of Claims (which is
substantially similar in language to FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)). The Court of Claims granted relief
on the basis of "our sense of justice." Id. at 148. The dissent based its conclusion on cases
decided under rule 60(b), arguing that relief should not be available since the plaintiff had
not appealed and relief is not available in the event of a change of law. The Court of Claims,
in allowing relief against the government, appears to have given itself more leeway than its
rules might otherwise allow. Plaintiff's failure to appeal would have been fatal in the district
courts. See Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193 (1950).
W' alker v. Hutchinson City, 352 U.S. 112 (1956).
254 F.2d at 839.
59 386 U.S. 1007 (1967).
"o Hellenic Lines v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306 (1970).
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nal case.' Tsakonites sought relief under rules 60(b)(5) and (6); in
light of the change of law, the court granted relief without articulat-
ing the clause on which it relied."
The original suit in Pierce concerned an automobile accident in
which Pierce, Davis, and Ellenwood, riding in the same car, were
injured by Edwards, an independent contractor working for the
defendant-shipper. Pierce and the others filed separate suits in state
court, all of which were removed to the federal courts. Davis was
able to dismiss his suit and refile it in state court with a guardian-
ship provision that destroyed diversity. In Pierce's case, the federal
district court granted Cook summary judgment on the basis of an
Oklahoma case 3 which relieved a shipper of liability for the torts of
an independent contractor. Pierce's appeal was unsuccessful since,
under the Erie rule, 4 Oklahoma law controlled. More than three
years after Pierce's original judgment became final, Davis's case
reached the Oklahoma Supreme Court. The court specifically over-
ruled the Oklahoma precedent previously relied on 5 and remanded
the case.66 Pierce and Ellenwood then filed for relief under rule
60(b); the court granted relief under rule 60(b)(6).
For the majority of the court,67 Judge Breitenstein distin-
guished Collins on the grounds that the decisional change of law in
Collins came in an unrelated case. Emphasis was placed on
Gondeck v. Pan American World Airways, 8 a common accident case
which, however, did not involve rule 60(b). In Gondeck the Supreme
Court granted a petition for rehearing of a denial of certiorari and
reversed judgment in order to reach consistent results in the com-
mon cases. 9 Judge Breitenstein also stressed that the Erie rule had
been violated in that "[t]he federal courts in which plaintiffs were
forced to litigate have given them substantially different treatment
than that received in state court by another injured in the same
S Id. at 307.
52 The court relied on Tarkington v. United States Lines Co., 222 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1955),
as precedential support for relief in this situation. Reliance on Tarkington, however, was
inappropriate; see note 56 supra.
Marion Mach., Foundry & Supply Co. v. Duncan, 187 Okla. 160, 101 P.2d 813 (1940).
" Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). For a discussion of the application of the
Erie doctrine to the situation presented in Pierce, see Note, Pierce v. Cook & Co.: Change in
State Law as a Ground for Relief from a Federal Judgment, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 843 (1976).
Hudgens v. Cook Industries, 521 P.2d 813 (Okla. 1974).
" Id. The case was then settled favorably for the plaintiff.
" The Tenth Circuit heard the case en banc, eight judges sitting.
" 382 U.S. 25 (1965).
" Id. at 27.
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accident."7 In his concurring opinion, Judge Barrett emphasized
that this case succinctly presented the difficulty of applying chang-
ing state law in the federal forum. Judge Barrett argued that relief
from a final judgment should only be available to the party that did
not invoke federal jurisdiction.71
All of these cases are in agreement with the Ackermann princi-
ple that appeal is a necessary condition for relief under rule
60(b)(6). However, the cases conflict as to whether, after appeal, a
judicial change of law is a sufficient condition for relief. The two
cases which meet the necessary condition of appeal, Tsakonites and
Collins, are in conflict. A similar conflict exists between Collins and
Pierce, although it could be argued that the need to conform to the
Erie doctrine (and not the change of law) was the condition suffi-
cient for relief in Pierce .7 2 Thus, Pierce does not answer this question
since there were other factors in that case which could have been
sufficient to create the exceptional circumstances justifying relief.
Taken together, the seven cases considering a change of law under
rule 60(b)(6) do not present a consistent picture.
III
A. Comparison of the Present System with the Conflicting Goals
of Finality and Equity
As a practical matter, relief from final judgments in the event
of a change of law is available only under rule 60(b)(6); relief under
rule 60(b)(5) is limited to orders with prospective application, and
the "based on" language of rule 60(b)(5) has been applied very
narrowly. The efficacy of granting relief under rule 60(b) (6) must be
considered in light of the goals of any system granting relief from
final judgments. The lack of clarity as to whether a judicial change
of law constitutes the extraordinary circumstance required by rule
70 518 F.2d at 723. The basis for relief under rule 60(b)(6) in Pierce can be seen as the
court's desire to make the Erie doctrine work; this promotion of the Erie doctrine would
constitute the exceptional circumstances justifying relief. The major theoretical underpinning
of the Erie doctrine is that litigation will reach the same results whether in the state or federal
courts. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). To achieve the results mandated in
Guaranty Trust, the court in Pierce was compelled to grant relief. This desire to apply the
Erie doctrine, strongly reflected in the majority's opinion, may have been a sufficient condi-
tion to grant relief under rule 60(b)(6). The court does not clearly indicate whether the Erie
doctrine, or the change of law, or the equities of the situation, or all three, was the decisive
factor in granting relief under rule 60(b)(6).
1' 518 F.2d at 724-25. Judges Lewis and Seth argued in dissent that the court was
overruling the Collins case. Id. at 726.
7' See text and note at note 70 supra.
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60(b) (6) has led to inconsistent results through a rule which is both
uncertain and difficult to apply. Rather than promote finality and
equitable results, the present method of granting relief in the event
of a change of law has drawn these two ideals into conflict.
The primary source of confusion in granting relief under rule
60(b)(6) is that the rule provides no greater guidance than "any
other reason justifying relief." From an equitable standpoint, it
could be argued that an unrefined rule for relief allows the courts
leeway to cope with new circumstances. However, in this situation
the lack of guidelines for relief has made the granting of relief in the
event of a change of law inequitable in relation to the similar cases
in which relief has been denied. Similarly, the goals of finality have
not been furthered by application of rule 60(b)(6). The case law is
clearly inconsistent. Finality of judgments is designed in part to
bring an end to litigation, but the inconsistent results under rule
60(b)(6) could encourage any litigant to seek relief when the law
changes. Finality of judgments is furthered by clear rules of law, but
the cases conflict in treating a change of law as sufficient ground for
relief from a final judgment. Finality also has its equitable overtones
as it protects judgments won, but this protection is also lessened by
the lack of certainty as to when the court will grant relief from a
final judgment.
B. A Proposed Solution
To promote the ideals of finality and equitable results, it is
submitted that relief in the event of a judicial change of law should
be governed by rule 60(b) (5). The present distinction, granting relief
in cases in equity under rule 60(b)(5) and cases at law under rule
60(b)(6), would be abolished.13 Rule 60(b)(5) would not be limited
by the narrow interpretation which the courts have previously given
it but rather would implement the plain meaning of its words. Ap-
plication of rule 60(b)(5) in the event of a change of law would lead
to consistent results through a rule which would be easier to apply
than the "extraordinary circumstances" requirement of rule
60(b)(6).
The language of rule 60(b)(5) is broad enough to encompass
relief from judgments in the event of a judicial change of law: the
rule provides for relief when
11 Rule 2 of the Federal Rules merges the actions which formerly had been at law or in
equity; limiting relief in the event of a judicial change of law to rule 60(b)(5) would cause a
similar merger and is therefore not inconsistent with the framework of the Federal Rules.
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a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or
otherwise vacated ....
The plain meaning of rule 60(b)(5) suggests that it provides the
basis for relief in the event of a judicial change of law; this meaning
has not been adopted. Adoption of the plain meaning of rule
60(b)(5) as the basis for relief in the event of a change of law is
preferable to the present usage of rule 60(b)(6). Once adopted, this
clause would serve as the sole avenue for relief due to a change in
law because of the mutual exclusivity requirement.
Relief under rule 60(b)(5) would be available in those circum-
stances which the language indicates. In the first place, the decision
from which relief is sought must have been based on a prior judg-
ment. The term "judgment" has a plain meaning, including deci-
sions of courts and, perhaps, administrative agencies; 74 "judgment"
would include decisions which formerly would have been either at
law or in equity. The term "based on" would follow the definition
of earlier cases such as Lubben v. Selective Service which conclude
that a judgment has been based on another if the precedent was
binding, rather than merely persuasive, and if, but for reliance on
the prior judgment, a different result would have obtained. 75
Furthermore, the prior judgment must have been "reversed or
otherwise vacated." It is submitted that this language encompasses
the overruling of the case at a later time. It could be argued that
the language of rule 60(b)(5) encompasses only the direct reversal
(presumably on appeal) of the prior judgment, but this interpreta-
tion ignores the "otherwise vacated" portion of the subsection. The
cases have not directly interpreted this language, 76 but the plain
meaning of the clause is sufficiently broad to encompass the subse-
quent overruling of a decision.
The method of application of rule 60(b)(5) in the event of a
change of law would vary greatly from the method of application of
rule 60(b)(6). Rather than determine on an ad hoc basis if the cir-
cumstances are exceptional enough to merit relief, relief under rule
71 In Class v. Norton, 507 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1974), relief from an injunctive order was
granted pursuant to the change of an administrative ruling. See also Block v. Thousand-
friend, 170 F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1948), granting relief from a judicial order after an administrative
agency reversed its prior decision.
71 See text at notes 26-31 supra.
71 In equity cases involving a change of law, the overruling of the basis for the decision
has been sufficient. System Fed'n v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642 (1950); McGrath v. Potash, 199
F.2d 166 (D.C. Cir. 1952). But see Lubben v. Selective Serv., 453 F.2d 645 (1st Cir. 1972).
The dissent in Polites v. United States, 364 U.S. 426 (1960), implies that the overruling of a
prior judgment is within the meaning of rule 60(b)(5).
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60(b) (5) would simply require a step-by-step application of the lan-
guage of the rule. The necessary and sufficient conditions for relief
would be the reversal of a prior judgment on which the decision was
based, coupled with the absence of other equitable reasons (such as
failure to take all possible steps before judgment, failure to seek
relief within a reasonable time, or the prejudice of intervening
rights)77 which would mandate a denial of relief. If the necessary and
sufficient conditions for relief were met, relief would be granted.
-'Rule 60(b)(5) basically provides a mechanical rule for deter-
mining if relief is available in the event of a change of law. The
automatic quality of rule 60(b) (5) is tempered by judicial discretion
in determining if the equitable requirements of relief (e.g., timeli-
ness of request have been satisfied. The effect of applying rule 60
(b) (5) is to increase the certainty, consistency, and ease of granting
relief in the event of a change of law. The most difficult aspect of
the application of rule 60(b) (5) would be to determine whether the
reversed judgment has been "based on" the later case, but the pro-
posed definition of this term should be sufficiently clear to provide
guidance to the court. For the litigant, the certainty of a final judg-
ment would be a function of whether the case was "based on" a
questionable prior judgment. If the litigant's judgment rested on a
solid legal foundation built on many principles, the finality of that
judgment would be certain. If the judgment was, however, balanced
precariously on a single case, the finality of that judgment would be
based on the case on which it rested. Besides providing a consistent
basis for relief from judgments, whether at law or in equity, the
application of rule 60(b)(5) would lead to more consistent results.
Under rule 60(b)(6) inconsistent results were foreshadowed by the
vagueness of the tests for relief; rule 60(b)(5) provides the concrete
guidelines which should lead to consistent results.
The ultimate test of applying rule 60(b) (5) as the basis for relief
in the event of a change of law is whether such relief can be granted
without sacrificing, to any great extent, either the finality of
judgments or equity of results. In contrast to rule 60(b)(6), which
has fostered inconsistent results which are contrary to both equity
and finality, the narrow criteria of rule 60(b) (5) should lead towards
the satisfaction of both of these ideals. Although, by definition, any
relief from judgments is contrary to the absolute principle of final-
ity, relief is least deleterious to finality if it is limited to carefully
defined circumstances. Since relief is to be granted under rule 60(b),
11 See text and notes at notes 33-35 supra.
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finality is strengthened most by a rule which clearly lists the criteria
for such relief. Furthermore, the cases indicate that relief can be
obtained in the event of a change of law; if such relief is to be
granted, finality demands strict parameters. In contrast to the
vague guideline of "exceptional circumstances" provided by rule
60(b)(6), the literal language of rule 60(b)(5) clearly provides the
grounds for relief. Consistency and certainty are the bulwarks of
finality-the specificity of rule 60(b)(5) bolsters both of these goals.
Relief under rule 60(b) (5), however, does not further the finality
of judgments at the expense of equitable goals. The basic equitable
principle behind relief in the event of a change of law-like cases
producing like results-is furthered. When a decision satisfies the
"based on" interpretation suggested by this comment, relief is
warranted as a matter of equity.78 But the certainty of when such
relief is to be available is also an equitable concern which rule
60(b)(5), in contrast to rule 60(b)(6), fosters. Finally, if a case pre-
sents exceptional circumstances, relief could be granted under
rule 60(b)(6) unless the mutual exclusivity rule would bar its appli-
cation.79
CONCLUSION
Rule 60(b) (5) provides the grounds for relief needed to achieve
equitable results without totally undermining the rule of finality.
Under rule 60(b) (6), there is confusion as to whether a change of law
constitutes the extraordinary circumstances justifying -relief; the
adoption of the guidelines of the plain language of rule 60(b)(5)
would eliminate that confusion. When combined with the general
equitable parameters of relief, the suggested guidelines for deter-
mining when to give relief due to a change in law would provide
consistency, certainty, and an ease of application. The balance be-
tween achieving equitable results when the law changes, and the
need for finality, could be maintained. If there is to be relief due to
a judicial change of law, whether the decision was at law or in
equity, relief should be governed by rule 60(b)(5).
Richard M. Lipton
' See note 35 supra.
SWeilbacher v. United States, 99 F. Supp. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), involved a legislative
change of the law. In this circumstance relief would not be available under rule 60(b) (5) since
no prior judgment has been reversed. This case represents the exception for which relief would
be available under rule 60(b)(6). The mutual exclusivity rule would not bar the application
of rule 60(b)(6) in this situation since there has not been a judicial change of law.
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